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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court over this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3 (2)(c), Utah Code Annotated, is not disputed. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a final judgment and order 
of the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, entered by the 
Honorable L.H. Griffiths, dated December 15, 1988. 
The Court found the attempted Reaffirmation Agreement in 
question to be void, being violative of Section 524 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and awarded judgment against the 
plaintiff/appellant, Utah State Credit Union, in the sum of 
$3,239.00 together with costs. Costs were fixed at $25.00 
making the total judgment $3,264.00. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Must the Order of the trial Court be vacated for 
failure of the trial Court to make written Findings of Fact 
or Conclusions of Law? 
II. Were defendants/respondents correctly held entitled 
to a refund of sums paid to the plaintiff/appellant under an 
invalid reaffirmation agreement? 
III. Was the Court correct in holding the payments in 
question not voluntary. 
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IV. Is the issue of the proper measure of damages in 
this matter properly before this Court, it never having been 
plead, presented or argued to the trial Court, 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
In addition to the statutes applicable to this question 
as set forth by the appellant, Respondents will rely on: 
30-2-1, Utah Code Annotated: Real and personal estate of 
every female acquired before marriage, and all property to 
which she may afterwards become entitled by purchase, gift, 
grant, inheritance, bequest or devise, shall be and remain the 
estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable 
for the debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and 
may be conveyed, devised or bequeath by her as if she were 
unmarried. 
30-2-2 Utah Code Annotated: Contracts may be made by a 
wife, and liabilities incurred and enforced by or against her, 
to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were 
unmarried. 
30-2-4 Utah Code Annotated: A wife may receive the wages 
for her personal labor, maintain an action therefor in her 
own name an hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute 
and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of 
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her rights and property as if unmarried. There shall be no 
right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury 
or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected there with, 
but the wife may recover against a third person for such 
injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall 
include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid 
or assumed by the husband. 
30-2-5 Utah Code Annotated: Neither husband nor wife is 
liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred 
before marriage, and, except as herein otherwise declared, 
they are not liable for the debts of each other contracted 
after marriage; nor or the wages, earnings, or property of 
either, or the rents or income of the property of either, 
liable for the separate debts of the other. 
Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Except in 
actions for divorce, Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear in at the trial. 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause. 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the 
minutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior to August, 1985, respondent William L. Gregg (Karen 
R. Gregg is not genuinely before the Court), secured a number 
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of loans from appellant Utah State Credit Union, hereinafter 
"USCU". Some loans were unsecured, and some were secured by 
a 1978 Fiat automobile and a 1984 Honda motorcycle. (Trans, 
p. 2) Karen Gregg was not originally obligated on all such 
obligations. (Trans, p. 29) 
On August 9, 1985, respondents filed a petition in 
bankruptcy under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy 
code. Due to a mistake on the part of the bankruptcy counsel, 
Karen Gregg did not appear at the Section 341 Meeting of 
Creditors and the Bankruptcy Court, for that reason, 
bifurcated the case and dismissed the proceeding as to Karen 
Gregg. During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, 
appellant attempted to create a reaffirmation agreement as to 
the obligations owing to them and requested that the Greggs 
appear at the Credit Union offices for that purpose. (Trans, 
p. 31) What was actually presented was a new promissory note, 
representing a consolidation of all of the pre-existing, pre-
petition dischargeable obligations, which William Gregg signed 
on or about October 10, 1985, and which Karen Gregg signed on 
or about October 17 or 19, 1985. This occurred prior to the 
entry of the discharge order as to respondent William Gregg. 
That order was entered November 22, 1985. 
It is not disputed and, in fact, was stipulated by the 
appellant at the trial below that as a reaffirmation 
agreement, the new note and disclosure statement was 
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absolutely invalid as it failed to comply in any way with the 
reaffirmation requirements of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C., Section 524. 
Within approximately 30 day after respondent signed the 
note in question, the Fiat automobile became inoperable, and 
the motorcycle was unusable, due to the winter cold, and 
neither vehicle was driven or used by respondent thereafter. 
(Trans, p. 9) Respondent Karen R. Gregg in any event never 
used the vehicles, as she is not even a licensed driver. 
(Trans, p. 12) 
Respondent William Gregg made payments on the obligation, 
quite irregularly (Trans, pp. 20, 21, 22, 25) until about 
March, 1987. The vehicles were repossessed, and the Credit 
Union obtained a value of $1,150.00 from sale of the vehicles, 
and it is not disputed that the Credit Union was paid 
$3,239.00 in cash for a total of payments under the note in 
question of $4,389.00. (Trans, p. 29) 
William Gregg made all of the payments himself from his 
separate funds. Mrs. Gregg, who has a separate income from 
child care services, made no payments of any kind. (Trans, 
pp. 4, 6) 
Following the repossession, appellant brought action in 
the trial Court below against respondents to collect all 
amounts allegedly due under the terms of the invalid 
reaffirmation agreement. William Gregg counterclaimed for 
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recovery of sums paid under the reaffirmation agreement which 
was invalid. Prior to trial, respondent Karen Gregg filed a 
new petition in bankruptcy. 
In response to plaintiff/appellant•s Complaint, 
respondent William Gregg had initially filed a pro se response 
in the nature of a counterclaim, requesting refund, and 
asserting the invalidity of the reaffirmation agreement. Only 
then did the plaintiff/appellant dismiss as to William Gregg, 
and appellant filed a motion to dismiss the pro se claim for 
failure to state a claim. Counsel then entered appearance on 
behalf of respondent William Gregg and filed an answer and 
counterclaim. 
With the dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's complaint 
against respondent William Gregg, and the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition by respondent Karen Gregg, the only issue 
remaining for trial was respondent William Gregg's claim 
against the appellant credit union. 
The case was tried to the Court without a jury on October 
4, 1988. The trial Court took the matter under advisement, 
and by memorandum decision dated December 9, 1988, and by 
order and judgment dated December 15, 1988, held the attempted 
reaffirmation to be invalid and awarded judgment in favor of 
respondent William Gregg in the sum of $3,239.00 together with 
costs. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lack of generation by the trial Court of a document 
formally titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does 
not require vacation of the Order and Judgment in this matter. 
Respondent William Gregg was clearly entitled under 
applicable law, to refund of cash paid to the credit union 
pursuant to the invalid reaffirmation agreement. 
The fact that the co-signer in this case was Karen Gregg, 
wife of William Gregg, is of no significance. Under the laws 
of the State of Utah, she is entitled to her separate income 
and property, and appellant is in no better position as to her 
than it would be as to unrelated co-signer. 
There was no evidence presented at trial regarding 
alleged pooling of funds by respondents, and appellant may not 
argue that for the first time in this Court. 
The time and manner in which the appellant attempted to 
obtain this reaffirmation, and their manner of proceeding 
thereafter, made the payments which respondent William Gregg 
made to them clearly not voluntary. 
The amounts of payments made and the value of the 
vehicles repossessed was not disputed by the parties, and the 
argument appellant now makes, regarding value of depreciation 
was neither pleaded, proven or argued to the Court below and 
therefore may not be considered by this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LACK OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OR VACATION OF JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE 
It is, of course, true that in this matter, no separate 
document titled Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was 
prepared. Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does 
provide that except in actions for divorce, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law may be waived by the parties either by 
default, or by failing to appear at the trial; by consent in 
writing, filed in the cause; or by oral consent in open Court 
entered in the minutes. 
Appellant herein did not, prior to filing Notice of 
Appeal, request specific findings and conclusions or object 
to the lack thereof. Respondent is, at this point, not aware 
of any Utah decision construing waiver by default, but it 
appears arguable that where the appellant did, in fact, fail 
to object or request findings and has fully briefed and argued 
the case to this Court, appellant has, by default, waived such 
findings. 
Further, it has been held by our Court that even in 
situation where a waiver is definitely not permissible, if a 
waiver is attempted, or no steps are taken at the trial level 
to obtain findings and conclusions, an appellant should not 
be allowed to try to take advantage of the lack of findings 
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and conclusions on appeal by demanding reversal. Farrell vs. 
Turner, 482 P.2d 117 (Utah, 1971). 
The most compelling reason, however, why the lack of 
entry of formal findings and conclusions does not mandate 
reversal or vacate the order here, is that the trial Court's 
decision was based in large part upon stipulated and 
undisputed facts. 
It has long been held in this jurisdiction that a 
memorandum decision of the Court can be regarded as Findings 
of Fact. Thomas vs. Thomas, 569 F.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977). 
Further, this Court in the case of Dover Elevator vs. Hill 
Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424 (Ut. App., 1988), ruled that 
while ordinarily, failure to comply with Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, would be reversible error, 
where facts are stipulated, that is the functional equivalent 
of findings, and where such facts therefore do not turn on 
witness credibility, the appellate Court has the same means 
as did the trial Court of reaching correct Conclusions of Law. 
Similarly, lack of formal Conclusions of Law is not reversible 
error where the appellate Court can look at the undisputed 
facts and make its own determinations of the proper 
Conclusions of Law. 
In this case, the following facts were either stipulated 
or undisputed, as shown by the transcript of the trial below: 
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Prior to August, 1985, obligations were owing to the 
appellant Utah State Credit Union, some secured, some not. 
(Trans, p. 2) 
Respondent Karen Gregg was not originally obligated on 
all prior obligations (Trans, p. 29); 
On August 9, 1985, respondents filed a petition under 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; 
On or about October 10 and/or 17 or 19, respondents were 
requested by and went to the appellant's offices to sign what 
they thought was a reaffirmation, but which was in fact simply 
a new promissory note constituting a consolidation of all of 
the prior obligations; 
All of the obligations included in the consolidation were 
prepetition obligations. 
The procedure used in obtaining respondents1 signatures 
on the note did not comply with the requirements of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Section 524, and as 
reaffirmation was completely invalid; 
Respondent William Gregg was granted discharge November 
22, 1985; 
That about 30 days after the signing of the new note, the 
automobile became inoperable and the motorcycle was unusable 
due to the winter cold, and neither vehicle was used or driven 
thereafter (Trans, p. 9) (appellant argued, and here argues 
that respondents had the possession and use of the vehicles 
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for a year and a half after the signing, but presented no 
evidence on that point); 
Respondent Karen Gregg never used the vehicles, not being 
a licensed driver. (Trans, pg. 12); 
Appellant repossessed the vehicles and realized $1,150.00 
from the sale of said vehicles; 
In addition to the value obtained on repossession, 
appellant was paid the sum of $3,239.00 in cash; 
The payments that were made, were made irregularly; 
That the appellant, following the signing, and prior to 
repossession, contacted respondents many times to compel 
payments. (Trans, pp. 15, 20-22) 
Payments were made solely by respondent William Gregg 
from his separate earnings. (Trans, pg. 4, 6) 
That the appellant, even after repossession and sale, 
initiated suit to enforce the terms of the note. 
From the above stated stipulated and undisputed facts, 
there is no question but that this Court is in as good as 
position as was the trial Court to make conclusions, and there 
is simply no need to reverse the trial Court, vacate the 
judgment, or remand for any further proceedings. 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENT WAS CORRECTLY HELD ENTITLED TO REFUND OF 
CASH PAID UNDER THE INVALID REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT 
Courts that have been presented with situations similar 
to that presented in this case, have directed that when a 
creditor receives payments pursuant to an invalid 
reaffirmation, the debtor is entitled to refund of those sums. 
In the case of In Re: Mandrel 1, 50 BR 593 (B. Tenn 1985), 
the Court found that when a debtor had entered into a 
reaffirmation agreement under the mistaken impression that the 
creditor in that case, Ford Motor Credit, had a valid security 
agreement which was set aside as an invalid preference by the 
bankruptcy trustee, that the debtor was entitled to a refund 
of the money so paid. In that case, even though the debtor 
had for some unspecified amount of time had possession of the 
use of the vehicle in question, since the security agreement 
was invalid, the creditor was not even entitled to the value 
of the security, although that, of course, is not in question 
here. 
A similar result seems to have occurred in the case of 
In Re: Gardner, 57 BR 609 (B Md. 1986), there, the debtor, a 
Certified Public Accountant, was sued in State Court for 
malpractice, along with his partnership. The Bankruptcy Court 
had granted relief from the stay to enable the State Court to 
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determine whether the debtor's insurance carrier would have 
to pay any judgment. Negotiation between the State Court, 
plaintiff and the carrier resulted in the parties being some 
$4,500.00 apart from settlement. The debtor voluntarily 
agreed to pay that amount, depositing $1,500.00 in escrow, and 
agreeing to sign a note for the remaining $3,000.00. Later, 
the debtor decided to rescind that agreement and demanded 
refund of the $1,500.00. 
The creditors in that case argued that since the debtor 
had voluntarily entered into the agreement and made the 
payments, and received new consideration, that he should be 
held to the terms of the agreement. The Bankruptcy Court 
ruled that even if the debtor's actions were voluntary, and 
even if he had received new consideration, that did not 
matter. The procedures for a valid reaffirmation were not 
followed, and the agreement was void. Although the reported 
opinion did not make it exactly clear, it appears that the 
creditors were reguired to refund the $1,500.00, as the report 
indicated that an Order to appropriate to the claim for 
relief, which included refund of that sum, would be entered. 
Further, in the case entitled Matter of Gilliland, 62 BR 
587 (B Neb. 1986), the Court had before it a case guite 
similar to the present proceeding. Debtors had signed new 
notes, post-petition and post-discharge. As here, proper 
procedures for obtaining a valid reaffirmation agreement were 
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not followed. Some payments were made, but after default, 
the creditor in question obtained a judgment in State Court 
for the balance due. The debtors went back to the Bankruptcy 
Court and demanded refund of the sums paid, as well as 
attorney's fees and other relief. 
That Court ruled that where the purported consideration 
for the new note was in whole or in part pre-petition 
obligations, dischargeable debts, that to be enforceable, the 
reaffirmation agreement had to follow all of the statutory 
requirements. If those requirements were not met, the 
agreements were void and the creditor had to return the 
payments made by the debtors, but was allowed to retain or 
take possession of the property that was subject to security 
interest. 
On the point of returning to that creditor the property 
subject to the security interest, the Gilliland Court 
indicated that the debtors were simply to return to the 
creditor whatever remained of the collateral. The bank in 
question would not be allowed to benefit from non-compliance 
with Section 524, because, said the Court, to do otherwise 
would allow creditors to tell a debtor that the debtor could 
keep collateral only if the debtor would resign on prior 
obligations, which the Court ruled would be contrary to the 
policies of the statute. 
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Appellant cites two bankruptcy court decisions to this 
Court allegedly for the proposition that the appellant should 
be allowed to keep the respondents1 money, In Re: Klappf 80 
BR 540 (B. W.D. Ok. 1987), and In Re: Whitaker, 85 BR 788 (B. 
E.D. Tenn. 1988). Neither of those decisions stand for the 
propositions that the appellant would here advance. 
In the Klapp decision, involving a ruling in objection 
to plan, the debtors were working on paying in Chapter 13 a 
debt that had already been discharged in a prior Chapter 7. 
The objecting creditors were contending in effect that they 
could hold the mortgage securing the discharged debt over the 
head of the debtors, to virtually coerce "voluntary" payments 
under the original obligation and that at any time such 
payments became in default, foreclose the mortgage. The 
Bankruptcy Court did not allow that result and in that case, 
the debtors, unlike respondents here, were allowed to keep the 
property, real estate, which had secured the obligation, and 
pay the debt in Chapter 13. 
In Whitaker, supra, the Court did not even come close 
to holding that the creditor in guestion could retain payments 
made by the debtor. In that case, there had been neither 
redemption of the collateral, nor had there been a 
reaffirmation, whether valid or invalid. The debtors, 
contending they were not in default on their obligation, had 
been making payments to the creditor all along. The court did 
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find that the filing of the bankruptcy in and of itself could 
have constituted default under the terms of the note in 
question and ruled that the debtor would have to choose 
between either a redemption or attempt to enter into a 
valid reaffirmation agreement. There was absolutely no 
indication in that opinion as to what would have happened or 
what did happen, had the debtor decided to surrender the 
vehicle. That case is simply not applicable. 
In another recent decision in a case somewhat similar to 
the present controversy, the Court in In Re: Kenderick, 75 BR 
451 (B. N.D Ga. 1987), ruled that the debtor in that case had 
to give back a vehicle that secured his obligation, but that 
the creditor had to refund to the debtor all funds it had in 
excess of the value of the vehicle as of the time of the 
discharge. 
Clearly, respondent William Gregg was entitled under the 
undisputed facts and the law applicable to those facts to a 
refund of the cash he had paid to the appellant herein. 
Appellant here attempts to argue that refund should not 
have been granted because it was entitled to collect from 
respondent Karen Gregg prior to her filing a new petition 
under some theory of the respondents1 money being pooled in 
a joint bank account. 
There was no evidence presented to the trial court of any 
pooling of funds in any kind of joint account. The sole 
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evidence on that point was the proffer and testimony of 
William Gregg which was that payments were made solely by him 
by his separate earnings and that his wife made no 
contribution thereto. It has long been the rule in this 
jurisdiction that matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to this Court. 
Utah Department of Transportation vs. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 
(Ut. 1979); Ebbert vs. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut. App. 1987). 
The appellant attempts to present these facts to the 
Court by attaching to its brief two exhibits, denominated A 
and B, neither of which were offered or introduced in the 
trial court. This the appellant cannot do. Documents not 
part of the trial court record cannot be considered on appeal. 
Chapman vs. Chapman, 728 P. 2d 121 (Ut. 1986); attaching a 
document to an appellate brief does not make the document part 
of the record. Blodgett vs. Zions Fist National Bank, 752 
P.2d 901 (Ut. App. 1988), (footnote 1 at pg. 903, citing 
Watkins vs. Simonds, 14 UT 2nd 406, 386 P.2d 154 (1963). 
The Beehive State Bank vs. Rosequist, 21 Ut. 2nd Ut. 17, 
439 P.2d 468 (1968), and Peterson vs. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360 
(Ut. 1977), decisions cited by the appellant do not, in 
respondent's view hold as appellant represents; they are 
nevertheless, irrelevant. The only evidence on the question 
was undisputed that the payments were from respondent William 
Gregg's separate funds. Appellant would argue that this is 
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a fiction created by the appellants, but the contrary is the 
case. 
Utah law provides, in Section 30-2-4 & 5, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), that wife is perfectly within her 
rights to earn her separate wages and maintain her separate 
funds. As a co-signer, Mrs. Gregg may have, absent her new 
petition in bankruptcy, been separately obligated on the note, 
but in that respect is in no different a position than would 
be an unrelated co-signer. Had the co-signer, in fact, been 
unrelated, the result as to respondent William Gregg would 
have been and should have been no different. 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PAYMENTS MADE WERE NOT VOLUNTARY 
As noted, neither of the vehicles involved in this case 
were used beyond about 30 days following the signing of the 
new note. 
Also, it was not disputed that the total amount of the 
new obligation included consolidation of pre-existing notes 
that had never been secured. Appellant was seeking to compel 
payment of several obligations, default on which would result 
in further legal action. 
Respondent continued to try to make payments, believing 
at the time that he was under legal compulsion to do so by way 
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of the new note, and being concerned about further legal 
action being taken. 
Further, the respondents were contacted many times by the 
Credit Union regarding payments on the loan, which had been 
made rather irregularly, and were more often than not 
delinquent. (Trans, pp. 14 & 15) Appellant, in fact, sent a 
representative to the trial to testify regarding collection 
efforts and contacts with the respondents in an effort to 
enforce the terms of the note. The appellant, according to 
its representative's testimony (Trans, pg. 22) was aware at 
least as early as December 31, 1986, that the Fiat automobile 
was not running, but collection efforts, nevertheless, 
continued. 
Following default, the appellant then not only took 
possession of the collateral and sold it, but then instituted 
legal action to attempt to compel payment by both respondents. 
Appellant protests that because, (only after respondents filed 
a pleading in the Court below setting forth discharge, in 
validity of reaffirmation agreement and seeking refund) 
appellant caused the claim against respondent William Gregg 
to be dismissed, that they were doing nothing to force or 
compel payments and that, ipso facto, payments made were made 
voluntarily. 
It is perhaps to ask this Court to indulge in speculation 
as to what the appellant would have done in terms of 
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collection efforts had no responsive pleading never been filed 
in the Court below, but the fact remains that following the 
signing of this new note (which, of course had been on the 
pretext that it was to be a reaffirmation agreement) the 
appellant made continual contact with the respondents to 
enforce payments, even up to filing suit against them. Under 
such circumstances, how the payments that were made can be 
argued to have been voluntary is beyond respondents' 
understanding. 
In fact, in that respect, this case was very similar to 
what the Court found in the case In Re: Klapp, supra, a 
decision cited by the appellant, and which is instructive on 
the question of voluntariness. 
The facts of that decision were discussed in detail 
above, and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say, that 
in that case, as here, creditors were using the threat of 
foreclosure to compel payment. 
Here, the respondents were asked to, as a condition of 
trying to keep a couple of motor vehicles, sign a new 
obligation which included clearly dischargeable unsecured 
notes and then exerted pressure on them to pay the full 
amounts. 
In Re: Whitaker, supra, also cited by the appellant, is 
also not explicable in this situation. In that case, there 
had been neither an attempt at redemption nor a reaffirmation. 
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Under the provi sions of Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
an .'it"n?r ( 1 redfr' rr rr --c . - . . : •
 f 
anc ^LJSO .. *~e]y r-<^ s^  ^ omuiy v. i Mi .h.e • nqun tJirtrrn1. 01 .iat 
section order *o n: ^aLid. ['he Whitaker -v\r+ -en1 ~he 
jni.ary \<; Lht- appellant's assertion, . aecsio, was 
made a.Iowinc creditors * ) retain i:ie payments that nad oeen 
o L estate, jiiai happened :ier*- v-as "^ry similar to .\at 
•""nirrr^ fi ^ the Gi lliiand decision, oupra, vJhi^ ? vas "ondemned 
[*ne appe. iani railed *::(•: respondents • o i - ;: offices, and 
required them, as a condition u: ^ M T . ,-d 
them to execute a consolidation nor,.-,
 fc, | _ ,;^ r;,,o :...t- pendency 
•" *.rsooi^ .u;!V '/iiiiaiT Gregg's i.an;«:ruptcy and thereafter did 
every • -
luer*. : o^ inpiy nu way t^ u^idLruc these oayuients of 
saving been T/o ...- --arv -IP.; *-he aope' ant ^hou1^ '••.*- ^  - • a L. lowed 
t : t c 1 :;: e a I^  > _ _, _
 Jt ; i t f i: o i n - w r o i l g f u ] c 3. 
POINT IV 
ft PPELLANT'S ATTEMPT TO ASSERT IMPROPER MEASURE OF 
Di \1 IAGES WAS NOT PRESENTED IN ANY FORM TO TRIAL COURT 
AND MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 
Appellant, in Point II of this argument, now asserts for 
the first time that the Trial Court used the wrong standard 
for determine damages, and argues that appellant should be 
compensated some depreciation value of the collateral from 
the date of the bankruptcy filing. 
At the trial below, the case was presented to the Trial 
Court by the parties stipulating that the value of the 
collateral at the time of sale was $1,150.00 and that 
respondent had made cash payments in addition to that totaling 
$3,239.00 and tried the case, based on those figures, on the 
theories of whether respondent was entitled to refund of that 
amount of cash due to the admittedly invalid attempt at 
reaffirmation; and whether the appellant could retain the cash 
because the payments were voluntary. 
No other measure of damage issue was either pleaded or 
argued by appellant. 
In Lance vs. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Ut. 1086), the Court 
ruled that issues not raised by pleading and not addressed to 
the Trial Court cannot be considered on appeal. the matter 
was stated quite appropriately in Combe vs. Warren's Family 
Drive Ins, Inc. , 680 P.2d 733 (Ut. 1984), where it stated that 
the Court cannot adjudicate issues not raised before or during 
trial and unsupported by the record. 
The Court went on to hold: 
"The Court may not grant judgment for relief 
which is neither requested by pleading nor 
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withii i theory on which the case was tried, 
whether that theory was expressly stated 
or implied by proof adduced . . . The parties 
may limit the scope of litigation if they 
choose, and if an issue is clearly withheld, 
the Court cannot, nevertheless, adjudica' *-* "+-
and grant corresponding relief." 
5 80 I 2- i ; 33, ; 3 6 
_ issue not may now be presented to this Coi irt „ 
CONCLUSION 
Court .a'ju.v. be dffirmed t ui respects for * te .^,uing 
reasons: 
1. f - ..i^ ii.5 were unnecessary in 
this case given the stipulated ana i:v.disputed facts upon wl lich 
the Trial CM--* ' <?eci:;b"t was "art 
2. L'ncei ...u *.... .i.p.icdi^o •: o ^ n case^f respondent 
was fully entitled to itjf-.jnd of the funo.-» ! ha* *•*- -a i P- * 
the reaffirm/it inn . t« IMMMIII'I it in IJIH '.! JI J 
and the payments h a v m q been not. vo I uiiLdii :y maae. 
3. On t*--- ssues o«'*ua: y ''r^^f^e < * • ^  ~'<i tried by the 
C 
Respondents therefor*-- 'especttuily request that the 
judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed, and thai, this court 
2 3 
award respondent costs and such other relief as is 
appropriate. 
A/ ^  day of / ^ ^ • » / , 1989. DATED this 
' "7 
Respectfully Submitted, 
$f WAYNJ^ GILLMAN 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ^ / "^ day 
of " ^ >ar > V~ , 1989, four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document were served upon the 
appellant by delivering the same to the following: 
Dale R. Kent 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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